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1 A demonstrator holds a sign reading “Stop Foreclosures Save Our Homes” during a protest outside the venue of the Wells Fargo & Co.
annual shareholders meeting in San Francisco, California, on Tuesday, April 27, 2010. 2 A trader works on the floor of the New York
Stock Exchange September 15, 2008 in New York City. In afternoon trading the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell over 500 points as
U.S. stocks suffered a steep loss after news that Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc was selling itself to Bank of America Corp., the financial firm
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, and insurance giant American International Group Inc. (AIG)
was approved to secure capital from itself. 3 Protestors shout anti-government slogans in front of the Greek Parliament in Athens on
May 5, 2010. Athens police chiefs mobilized all their forces, including those not on active duty, to restore order on May 5 amid rioting
during protests against a government austerity drive.

IS CRISIS
INEVITABLE?

1 Customers of Northern Rock queue outside the Kingston branch of the company on Castle Street, in order to take their money out of
their accounts on September 15, 2007 in London, England. Northern Rock is seeking emergency help from the government, causing its
customers to lose faith in the bank. 2 A general view during construction of new buildings on December 12, 2008 in Dubai, United Arab
Emirates. The global financial crisis has taken its toll in Dubai with construction slowing and many projects in the planning stage being
cancelled. 3 Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke testifies during a hearing before the House Financial Services Committee
July 22, 2010 on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC. Bernanke testified on “Monetary Policy and the State of the Economy.”

CAN WE LEARN
FROM HISTORY?

1 Financial professionals in the Goldman Sachs booth on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange at midday watch President Obama
give a speech about Wall Street financial reform April 22, 2010 in New York City. President Obama scolded Wall Street for the financial
crisis during his speech, and suggested a path toward regulation to help prevent fiscal crises in the future. 2 Axel Miller, Chief
Executive Officer of the Dexia Group, speaks to members of the media outside the Dexia Bank headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, on
Tuesday, September 30, 2008. Belgium and France threw Dexia SA a €6.4 billion ($9.2 billion) lifeline and the chairman and chief executive
officer stepped down as the widening financial crisis forced governments to prop up institutions across Europe. 3 Protestors walk out
of the lobby of the Bear Stearns headquarters March 26, 2008 in New York City. Hundreds of housing activists overwhelmed security and
stormed the lobby of the Bear Stearns skyscraper in Manhattan, staging a noisy rally and protesting the government-backed sale and
bailout of the investment bank.
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GOOD LEADERSHIP
MATTERS

Executive Summary
RECENT BOOKS AND ARTICLES HAVE ANALYZED THE CAUSES OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL AND

economic crisis of 2007-09. Yet little attention has been paid to the quality of
leadership in organizations that were at the epicentre of the storm, were victims
of it, avoided it or even prospered from it.
In the summer of 2009 a multi-disciplinary group of Ivey faculty decided
to look at the leadership dimensions of the recent financial and economic crisis.
We started by writing a working paper that laid out our preliminary views. We
then engaged more than 300 business, public sector and not-for-profit leaders
in small and large groups, as individuals and collectives, to get their reaction to
this paper and, more generally, to discuss the role that organizational leadership
played before, during and after the crisis. We examined leadership not just in the
financial sector but also in many other public and private sector organizations
that were affected by the crisis.
In a sense, we were putting leadership on trial. Our aim in doing this
was not to identify and assign blame. Rather, we examined leadership during
this critical period in recent history to learn what we could, and use the learning
to improve the practice of leadership today and the development of nextgeneration leaders.
As we analyzed the role of leadership in this crisis we were faced
with one major question: “Would better leadership have made a difference?”
Our answer is unequivocal: “Yes!”
We recognize that many people could argue it is unfair to criticize leaders
whose decisions were based on their knowledge of the situation at the time and
which only eventually, with the aid of 20/20 hindsight, proved bad. We respect
this view but we disagree with it. Some business and public sector leaders
predicted better than others the bursting of the housing bubble and financial
markets turmoil, positioned their organizations to avoid problems, and coped
with them skillfully. Their organizations were not badly damaged by the crisis
and some even prospered. Some governments and regulatory agencies’ control
and monitoring systems were superior to those in the U.S., the U.K., Ireland,
Spain, Iceland and other countries that had to bail out their banks and other
industries. Our evidence supports the conclusion that these companies, these
agencies, these governments and these countries had better leadership. Good
leadership mattered then and good leadership will matter in the future.
We are presenting our conclusions about what good leadership involves
in the form of a public statement of principles—a manifesto that addresses what
good leaders do, who they are, and how they can be developed in organizations.
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We believe that these principles apply to leadership in diverse
contexts, during booms and busts, in calm and in crisis and across a broad
swath of industries.
The ideas about leadership presented in this volume derive from
the observations and insights of many scholars, writers, philosophers,
playwrights, social commentators and practitioners whom we acknowledge as
our inspiration. They have been refined through our own empirical and clinical
research and educational experience with leaders in the corporate, public and
not-for-profit sectors. We have sought to blend the wisdom of the ages with the
current context in which leaders operate and the real-world challenges they
will face in the coming years.
Financial crises have occurred at frequent, if not totally regular, intervals
throughout history and many of them have resulted in prolonged economic
recessions. Since the infamous “South Sea Bubble” in the U.K. in 1720, the
“panics” of 1792 and 1797 and throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, there
have been economic and banking crises every five to 10 years affecting one
or more economic powers.1 In 1997, we experienced the collapse of Long-Term
Capital Management (LTCM) followed by the collapse of the dot.com bubble, and
the crash in the high-tech industry in 2001. While none of these was anywhere
as devastating as the financial crisis of 1340 that originated in Venice and that,
according to at least one account, plunged the world into the “dark ages” that
lasted a couple of hundred years,2 there is a pervasive sense that recently the
world came close to a repeat of the Great Depression of the 1930s, averted only
by the strong and concerted actions of the governments comprising the G8 and
G20 groups of developed and developing nations in late 2008 and 2009.
Examinations of these many financial and economic crises reveal
four truths.
First, they all had victims, not just financiers, bankers and brokers, but
also ordinary working people—people on pensions, people saving nest-eggs for
retirement—and, ultimately, society as a whole.
Second, these were no acts of God or natural phenomena, but resulted
from deliberate or unwitting decisions by individuals or groups with devastating
consequences for others.
Third, they could have been avoided had people learned from
previous crises.
Fourth, while consciousness about crises and their roots is heightened
immediately after they occur, it disappears in time, and people resume their
previous behaviours.
This history has resulted in many business and government leaders
accepting the idea that such crises are inevitable and unpreventable. Indeed,
some have even declared these crises as the de facto “governing mechanism”
required to cope with the consequences of the animal-like urge to pursue risk
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and this urge is at the heart of the virtuous, entrepreneurial financial system
that brings wealth and higher standards of living to developed economies.
With repeated failures in the financial system has come acceptance of their
inevitability and with this acceptance some dissociation from personal
responsibility. This is unfortunate since it detracts from the motivation to
work at preventing future recurrences.
The near-collapse of the global financial system in the fall of 2008 also
reawakened many people to the fact that the business of Wall Street, and other
financial centres around the world, is far too important to be left entirely up
to business people to manage. Within democratic capitalist systems, business
has always had a conditional licence to operate in the interests of owners and
shareholders. Business has generally been free to do so provided it served the
expressed and implicit needs of the societies within which it operated. When it
ceases to do so—as occasionally in the past—its freedoms have been curbed
either by regulatory action or the behaviours of customers in the marketplace.3
The shortcomings of some business leaders that were exposed during
the recent financial and economic crisis came very close to undermining the
legitimacy of the capitalist system. This is currently being reflected in greater
legislative and regulatory control of the financial system simply because too
many financial leaders, in the aggregate, convinced policy-makers that they are
ill-equipped to lead in the interest of either their shareholders or the public
interest, let alone both.
The fact that there were really good leaders, who steered their
organizations clear of many of the excesses and poor practices that got others
into trouble, has tended to be ignored in the popular media. However, their
sound leadership is reflected in the principles of good leadership we present
in this work.
The material in this volume is divided into six sections in addition to
this executive summary:
A description of the context within which this research was carried
out—the economic boom, financial crisis, recession and recovery of 2003-2010.
The research itself, divided into a brief section on methodology, and
the findings from our interviews, focus groups and other consultations, and the
conclusions we drew from the research study.
Principles of leadership addressing what good leaders do, who they are,
how they develop and how organizations can develop more, and better, leaders.
A call to action suggesting what management educators, executives,
boards, HR and learning and development professionals can do to improve the
current practice of leadership and develop next-generation leaders.
A short conclusion that outlines our commitment to continue to develop
curriculum, materials and programs that support the concepts and principles
underlying good leadership argued for in this book.
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It will take years for the in-depth cause-and-effect analyses of this
most recent financial meltdown and economic crisis to be completed and, even
then, there will be questions about “who did what and why.” We cannot wait
for years—the world moves too quickly. We need to take to heart philosopher
George Santayana’s warning, “Those who cannot remember the past are
condemned to repeat it.” 4 Lessons have been learned from this recent crisis
but it is not a given that these lessons will stick.
We do not accept that the excesses, misjudgments and inactions of the
last few years are inevitable and must somehow be repeated. But we recognize
they could, and likely will be, unless concerted action is taken to learn and apply
the lessons from this crisis. In addition to legislative and regulatory change now
well underway, we require improved management education, better leadership
development within organizations, and better training and development of
regulators and policy-makers. We also need politicians who are able to climb
above immediate electoral concerns and take the long view—the leadership view.
Cynics say this will never happen. Skeptics say it’s unlikely. We say
there is no alternative that makes sense for our future economic prosperity
and social well-being.
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Financial and Economic Crisis (2007-09)
WE DO NOT INTEND TO REPLAY THE FULL STORY OF THE RECENT GLOBAL FINANCIAL AND

economic crisis. That has been done in many excellent books and will, no doubt,
be analyzed by academics and others for decades to come. It is important,
however, to describe some of the context within which we examined leadership
behaviours since we contend that good leadership is very much about how
people utilize simple principles to act in difficult contexts.
Figure 1 (page 25) summarizes what happened in the period leading
up to the crisis that unfolded in 2007-09. It could be summarized as a cyclical
recession overlaid with a banking crisis resulting in the longest, deepest global
recession since the 1930s.
EARLY ORIGINS

The origins of this crisis lay in the continuous and accelerating buildup of household
debt in advanced economies that began in the 1960s, which was accompanied
and facilitated by credit expansion in the financial system. At the root of this
buildup of credit and risk were two U.S. government policy decisions that were
mirrored by many other governments around the world, especially in the U.K.
One was the decision to encourage home ownership as a social priority.
In the U.S., mortgage loans were made on very liberal terms to middle-class
and lower-income borrowers through two federally mandated companies, known
as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, that securitized the loans and sold them on
the bond market.
The other was the decision by Congress, in the waning weeks of the
Clinton administration, to deregulate financial services and, specifically, to allow
derivatives to be traded without visibility or regulatory oversight. It created,
in effect, a “shadow banking system” hidden from regulatory oversight,5
and not subject to the capital requirements of the normal banking system,
which multiplied many-fold the amount of leverage and risk in the global
financial system.
INCREASED DEBT AND LEVERAGE

Following the short post-9/11 recession, consumer spending increased
dramatically in most advanced economies but especially in the U.S. and U.K.
This spending was not fuelled by increases in personal disposable income but
by massive consumer borrowing from banks and consumer finance companies
in the form of mortgage debt, home equity loans, automobile leases and
mounting credit card balances. While increasing their debt loads, many people
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felt “rich” because their house values were increasing at double-digit annual
rates in many urban and recreational markets, stock markets were booming,
and their pension plan assets in stock plans were increasing in value. They also
felt reasonably secure because unemployment was low. Speculation in real
estate reached record proportions with many middle-income individuals owning
multiple properties for purposes of investment. People refinanced their houses,
using equity released by this to service ever-increasing debt loads and take on
more debt for purchases. Some believed they could continue to do this forever
and joined a “revolving debt” subsector of society whose concern was not in
paying off debt but only in meeting debt-servicing costs.
This credit expansion was fuelled by very low interest rates and what
appeared to be plenty of capital in the financial system. Banks and leasing
companies had money to lend because they did not retain ownership of many of
the loans. Rather, they sold them off to investment banks that packaged them,
together with car leases and other consumer loans, first into collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs) and then into derivatives of these CDOs. These were assigned
risk ratings by debt rating agencies and sold around the world to yield-hungry
institutional and individual investors.
There was so much demand for these securities that specialized
mortgage-lending banks and brokers were urged to lower their credit standards
further, to the point they were making a variety of sub-prime mortgage loans,
many with very low initial interest rates and easy repayment terms. The most
liberal of these became known as NINJA loans, where the borrower had
“no income, no job and no assets.” These sub-prime loans were securitized,
mixed with higher quality loans, rated as investment-grade by bond rating
agencies, and sold in special investment vehicles (SIVs) to everyone from
individual savers to municipal treasurers to pension plans and other fixedincome asset accumulators. For a time it looked as if financial engineers had
done what the alchemists had always dreamed of doing—turning lead into
gold or, in this case, sub-prime loans into investment-grade securities.
For reasons that will be debated for years, the U.S. Federal Reserve
and its equivalent in the U.K. allowed the property asset bubble to develop and
continued to pursue low interest rate policies despite the buildup in debt levels
in both the household and financial services sectors of the economy. They did
this in the express belief that market forces and the self-interest of financial
institutions would control the risk without need for regulatory intervention or
restrictive monetary policy.
THE HOUSING ASSET BUBBLE BURSTS

It was a fateful decision. In the fourth quarter of 2006, the U.S. housing market
softened and house price increases slowed or, in some areas, actually fell. By
mid-2007, U.S. house prices had dropped about 25 per cent from their peak one
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FIGURE 1:

The Financial/Economic Crisis of 2007-09
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year prior and were down to mid-2004 levels. The causes were clear: there was
an oversupply of new houses as builders responded to demand by building more;
interest rates increased as central banks finally sought to reduce inflationary
pressures and energy-led price increases spread through the economy, thereby
increasing costs to borrowers; personal disposable income was not keeping pace
with debt-servicing costs for many homeowners; and slowing or falling house
prices made them unable to pay increased carrying costs by refinancing their
houses. Credit cards were tapped out, people couldn’t borrow and they had to
reduce expenditures. Many people could not afford to buy new expensive houses
and those that could did not because they were trying to save and reduce debt.
EARLY WARNING SIGNS IN THE BANKING SECTOR

Borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) suddenly had to pay higher
rates that kicked in when the introductory teaser rates ended. Some walked
away from their properties when amounts owed on mortgages exceeded
the market value of properties. Repossessions increased and in states such
as Nevada, Arizona and Florida, house prices dropped dramatically as these
repos came onto the market or people sold at distressed prices. Some financial
institutions that had backstopped lending for individual mortgages and
derivatives found themselves without sufficient liquidity and adequate capital
to meet obligations once consumers defaulted on mortgages. Starting in
February 2007, some major financial institutions, such as HSBC Holdings and
Washington Mutual, began revealing the extent of their losses. By April 2007,
the second biggest sub-prime mortgage lender, New Century Holdings, had
declared bankruptcy. Others, such as Bear Stearns, Morgan Stanley and Merrill
Lynch, sold stock to raise needed capital and shore up their liquidity. Banks
became increasingly reluctant to lend to each other for fear loans would not be
repaid and they would need to conserve their capital to manage their own
distressed loan portfolios. The value of the property-based derivatives they held
became uncertain as the underlying sub-prime loans proved worthless.
RECESSION GRIPS

In the third quarter of 2007, the U.S., followed by other countries, slipped into
recession as the “wealth effect” of rising house values and a buoyant stock
market evaporated, energy prices soared to all-time highs, banks tightened
lending, individuals reduced spending, and businesses pared costs, laid off
employees, and deferred or cancelled planned expenditures. Unemployment
rose. Despite various governments’ efforts to stimulate their economies, the
recession worsened. In November 2007, the U.S. Federal Reserve and other
central banks around the world pumped reserves into the banking system while
aggressively cutting interest rates. During the next few weeks, the Fed and other
central banks took measures to get more liquidity into the banking system and
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prevent credit markets from seizing up completely. The U.S. and other governments
enacted several stimulus programs, including tax rebates and breaks to get
businesses investing and consumers spending. They didn’t work to stop the
economic slowdown and the “real economy” worsened—the world was heading
for a severe recession but many believed it would be short.
THE BANKING CRISIS UNFOLDS

Then the banking crisis—simmering for some time but not that visible outside
Wall Street, the City of London and other global financial centres—emerged
full force.
In March 2008, the U.S. Federal Reserve forced the sale of near-bankrupt
Bear Stearns to JPMorgan. In early September, the two dominant mortgage
lenders in the U.S., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were placed into conservatorship
and the federal government provided capital for them to continue operating.
By September 2008, Lehman Brothers faced bankruptcy, other financial
firms declined to come to its rescue, the government decided not to save it
and it filed for bankruptcy. Credit markets seized up and even firms such as
General Electric and AIG were unable to sell commercial paper to raise money.
Lehman Brothers’ failure in September 2008 started a domino effect.
One after another, financial institutions around the world failed or nearly failed.
Wachovia, Royal Bank of Scotland, Citibank, Merrill Lynch, Washington Mutual,
UBS, HBOS, and Hypo Real Estate were all among those that ran into severe
liquidity or capital insufficiency problems. Some went out of business. Others
were taken over by stronger institutions.
When insurance giant AIG almost failed, mainly because it had backed
credit default swaps, the U.S. Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury rescued it,
concluding failure could be contagious and paralyze the whole global financial
system. The U.K. government acted similarly with Royal Bank of Scotland and
Bradford and Bingley. Iceland followed suit with its three large banks. Governments
from Spain, Germany, Switzerland, France, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands,
Japan and others also dramatically recapitalized their banking systems. The
exception was Canada, whose banks required no recapitalization although they
did benefit from liquidity put into the system through low interest rates.
The 24-hour news and financial markets shows zeroed in on every
fact and rumour, magnifying and amplifying them while also expressing
horror at the resulting panic. In 2008, global stock markets plunged almost
one-third as margin buyers liquidated positions quickly and mutual funds and
hedge funds liquidated positions to pay for redemptions. As house and stock
prices plunged, the euphoria of paper-wealth was rapidly replaced by real fear.
Mainstream media compared events of 2008 to those of 1929 and the subsequent
Great Depression, which further fanned fear among consumers and the
business sector.
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THE “GREAT RECESSION” BEGINS

Consumers reacted in predictable ways. Those with no money for the necessities
of life—food, lodging, transportation, medicines, etc.—stopped paying debts,
including their mortgages, so they could cover basics. Those with surplus
income stopped spending. In the fourth quarter of 2008, car and appliance
sales, vacation travel, clothing purchases and other discretionary spending
dropped sharply so businesses supplying them had no demand. Consumers
simply went on strike!
Businesses with high fixed costs that depended on consumer demand
failed. Automobile manufacturing giants General Motors and Chrysler were
restructured and sold off after buckling under huge debts and reduced sales.
The recession that had started in the U.S. in 2007 became the “Great
Recession.” Through 2008 and early 2009, the GDP of advanced economies
dropped by anywhere from five to 20 per cent, unemployment climbed, and
governments moved into large deficit positions as they tried to counter the
recession with stimulus spending and prop up banking systems with loans
and liquidity injections into their economies.
RECOVERY STARTS

By mid-2009, the crisis appeared to end and recovery began. By summer 2010,
however, the “advanced economies” remain fragile and there are concerns some
could slip back into recession or, at best, face years of tepid growth. Public
finances are in poor shape in many countries with some, such as Iceland, Spain,
Italy, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Hungary, facing the prospect of radical
restructuring, with painful consequences for their populations in the form of
higher taxes, reduced pension benefits and increased retirement ages, as well
as public services reductions. Strong countries are under pressure to help
weak ones and, as in the Euro area that has a common currency, tensions are
emerging between countries that share a common currency yet have independent
fiscal policies. These may yet boil over into defaults and even divorce.
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Process
In the summer of 2009, a multi-disciplinary group of Ivey faculty prepared
a working paper identifying what it thought had gone wrong with leadership
through the 2002-07 “bubble” period in the global economy, the subsequent
financial sector meltdown in 2008, and resulting global recession.6 This working
paper was based on a review of contemporary leadership research and reports
that were beginning to appear in popular and serious magazines and journals,
and the few accounts of the events leading to the financial crash that were
beginning to appear in the first half of 2009.7 The paper proposed a number of
hypotheses as to the causes of the buildup of leverage in the financial system
in 2002-07 and the subsequent meltdown with a special focus on leadership
actions taken both in financial companies at the epicentre of the meltdown and
in the broader economy.
This was followed by 10 focus-group discussions with individuals and
groups of CEOs and C-Suite executives in Toronto, Vancouver, Calgary, Ottawa,
Montreal, New York, London (U.K.) and Hong Kong, using the working paper as
background reading for discussion. Participants were asked to read the working
paper in advance of these discussions and then a brief synopsis of the main
hypotheses in the paper was presented before moderated discussions got
underway. There were also numerous one-on-one discussions during the field
research period, September 2009 to May 2010, as well as presentations at
practitioner-attended conferences. Ivey’s advisory group of senior business
executives and entrepreneurs also played an active role in these discussions,
meeting with the research team on several occasions. In total, more than
300 individuals were engaged in small- or large-group settings.
During these months, we also presented and discussed our emerging
findings with individual leadership development professionals in major
corporations and the public sector and involved business students at various
levels in discussing our findings and tentative conclusions.
In the working paper and subsequent meetings we addressed
four questions:
n

n

What had gone wrong with leadership that contributed to the
2008-09 economic crisis and the subsequent devastation to people,
organizations and national economies?
Had this leadership problem been confined to the few organizations at
the epicentre of the financial meltdown or did this crisis reveal broadbased problems with leadership in both private and public sectors?
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n

n

What could we learn from those organizations and leaders who had
anticipated the crisis and avoided it completely, or who coped well and
were benefitting from the recovery?
What more do we need to do, or do differently, to prepare current
and future leaders to deal with the kinds of challenges we have seen
organizations face in the last couple of years and those—as yet
unknown—that they will face in the future?

Given the great sensitivity of a number of the issues discussed in these
sessions, we promised participants that the discussions would take place under
the “Chatham House Rule,” which promised participants we would not attribute
their comments or publicize their attendance at the sessions. Many of those
involved were Ivey alumni and were thereby predisposed to help us with this
venture. Participants were drawn from a broad range of organizations, large
and small, in a variety of industries, including representation from both the
public and not-for-profit sectors. Most sessions were taped and transcribed and
the anonymous quotations included in this volume are from those transcripts.
We readily acknowledge that using the working paper as a set-up for the focus
groups may have biased discussions. However, we take some comfort that
many participants expressed strong disagreement with our observations and
conclusions, although we made no attempt to quantify responses. We also
recognize that we were doing this research at the same time as the recovery
from the recession was taking place and that views about “what had happened
and why” were in flux.
We have also drawn from articles, speeches, talk show appearances,
books, documentaries and other publications of expert observers and direct
participants in the economic and financial events relating to the crisis. These
sources are acknowledged in the endnotes and integrated with the perspectives
we derived from our focus groups.
Findings and Discussion
The discussions in the research focus groups were rich, diverse and wideranging. In some sessions the primary emphasis was on leadership character;
in others the emergent topic of interest was executive compensation and, more
generally, rewards in financial sector companies; in others the focus was on
issues such as organizational risk culture, the social responsibility of leaders or
control mechanisms. We encouraged participants to move in the directions they
wanted to discuss, with little guidance on our part. As a result, some of the
group discussions focused on the ideas presented in the working paper,
whereas several of them went off into other directions, driven by the views and
interests of the participants.
What we are presenting in this section is a synthesis of the ideas in
the original working paper, our research discussions and the rapidly emerging
public literature about the crisis, some of which addresses leadership issues, if
only tangentially.
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FAILINGS OF CORPORATE LEADERSHIP

There was a dramatic moment at the start of Representative Henry Waxman’s
Congressional hearings on the financial crisis in October 2008, when a group
of rather stunned-looking bankers raised their right hands and testified they
had no idea as to the amount of risk that existed in the financial system, and
were totally surprised at what had happened. We have no reason to doubt their
testimony and, in the months since this event, it has become increasingly clear
that the global financial system that knit together money centre banks,
investment banks, merchant banks, insurance companies, proprietary and
market traders, hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds and institutional and
private investors was a complex system that defied understanding even by those
who had created it. We also agree that the actual financial meltdown was a true
“Black Swan”—an event that no one could have foreseen because of the complex
relationships between parties and counterparties in the financial markets.8
The fact that it was a complex system should not mask the fact that
those who chose to develop it and sought to make money from it made those
choices willingly. Nobody made them do it. Some of them bet all or part of their
businesses on the expanding credit bubble, which was underpinned by
There were leadership
rising house prices, in the belief that the risks were manageable. What
issues in the complexity
they put at risk was much greater than their own capital. They knowingly
problem—leaders didn’t
want to get their hands dirty
violated one of the fundamental principles of safe banking: borrowing
to learn the details and
short and lending long.
they didn’t facilitate the
There were leaders of other financial institutions who realized in right discussions.
2006-07 that much of the prosperity of the previous few years was based
MONTREAL
on a credit bubble—that it was a house of cards, a fantasy, an illusion
that would inevitably collapse or evaporate because of the rot in its foundation
resulting from the securitization of sub-prime loans. They realized the danger
of asset bubbles bursting as all bubbles do eventually. They understood that the
excessive leverage in the financial system was predicated on U.S. house prices
continuing to increase at more than the underlying economic growth rate if not
in perpetuity then at least for many years to come.9 And they realized that a
recession was surely coming that would pose significant risks to economies
fuelled by asset bubbles. This was not high finance. It was basic economics.
Published accounts and legislative committee hearings of what took
place in some of the investment, money centre, mortgage lending and
community banks confirm that within the broader financial community there
were also many people who understood the problem with unregulated hedge
fund activity, securitization of questionable mortgages, car loans and credit card
receivables, and the critical role that increasing house prices played in supporting
the credit bubble and, therefore, the leverage in the financial system.
Our research participants confirmed that this was so obvious to
insiders in the financial services industry that many of them steered well clear
of these types of investments, or limited their involvement to amounts that were
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manageable with their capital reserves. Others had made sure that they would
be protected from risk in the event of default by both buying credit default swaps
from insurance companies and ensuring that they held collateral from those
insurance companies. Certainly some of the staff of the bond and commercial
paper rating agencies who were paid to rate the securities based on
derivatives of sub-prime mortgages, car leases and other forms of consumer
lending knew full well that these securities did not deserve the ratings they
were being assigned.10
Those who decided to take a more prudent course curbed the desire
of many of their less experienced and aggressive staff to get involved in
the more complex financially engineered products. They developed sensible
policies and procedures by which they screened products and they kept
reasonable controls on those individuals.
While the speed and extent of the financial meltdown was shocking,
the fact that there was a liquidity crunch in response to a looming recession
came as a surprise to very few people in the financial markets. The
former chairman of Citigroup stated in a 2007 interview: “When the
People knew what was
music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will get complicated. But as
going on in the company.
They knew they were buying
long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re
more and more companies.
still dancing.”11 His was one of the companies that came close
They were getting further
to failing in the financial crisis and had to be rescued by the U.S.
and further in debt. They
knew it. They absolutely
government’s intervention.
knew it, but they just kept
While the failures of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers
going and going. And the CEO
and
the
near-failure
of AIG, Citigroup, Bank of Scotland and many
just allowed them to keep
doing it and doing it. He
other banks and insurance companies were at the epicentre of the
might be a nice guy,
storm, firms in the broader, Main Street economy also demonstrated
but he closed his eyes.
stress fractures. Giants such as General Motors and Chrysler were
HONG KONG
just the most visible casualties among thousands of businesses
around the world that seemed unable to withstand the recession
and liquidity crunch. Other organizations recognized the impending dangers
of over-leverage and trimmed investments, shored up their balance sheets,
focused on cost-control and were in good shape to withstand an inevitable
recession. Some CEOs, CFOs and treasurers of large, medium and
small corporations, hospitals and municipalities decided they would invest
their surplus cash in asset-backed commercial paper, mortgage-backed
securities or other synthetic products appearing to offer “more yield for the
same risk” than other more traditional instruments. Others decided that this
was too risky, understanding full well that there is no such thing as excess
return without excess risk.
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LEADERSHIP ACCOUNTABILITY

When we focused the microscope on leadership at the enterprise or business unit
level, we encountered some research participants who readily identified individual
firms or executives and were more than prepared to discuss why people did what
they did. This included some frank admissions about personal mistakes and errors
in judgment. They thought it important to identify “who did what and why” so future
generations of leaders could learn from their mistakes and prevent recurrences.
Others felt this was inappropriate. They asserted that leaders did what
they thought was right based on the information they had at the time, and it
was wrong and unfair of us to second-guess them with the advantage of perfect
hindsight. Their view was that individuals could not and should not be held
accountable for what was a “system” problem. They also felt analysis of events
would yield little value for future leaders or leadership development.
Some people were in denial.
There is no doubt that “the system” came close to a meltdown.
Others recognized there
However, we think deflecting discussion away from personal accountability were big flaws, but some
were unwilling to act or did
by focusing on the “system breakdown” would be inappropriate,
not have the courage to act,
unwarranted and, ultimately, not useful. This was, and is, about leaders
and others thought they
and the decisions they made that both created the system and led to its
were too small to act.
collapse. If we can’t or won’t learn from their mistakes because we
NEW YORK
won’t question their decisions, we stand little chance of preparing future
This crisis was both global
leaders to avoid them.
and pervasive. Trying to
We also heard of many organizations and leaders who had not
disaggregate it into a single
individual’s actions or
failed and some that were in great condition to benefit from an expected
decisions is impossible.
economic recovery. They had avoided or survived the storm, and their
It was a systemic failure.
approaches to leadership offer some really useful guides to good
NEW YORK
leadership practices.
When we got too
If we are to learn anything from this situation, we must focus
enthusiastic, our CEO
on individual, group, organizational and systemic causes, learning both
would always remind us:
trees don’t grow to the sky.
from those organizations that failed and those that avoided failure.
NEW YORK
Why did some leaders “get it” while others carried on,
seemingly oblivious to the dangers? It was as if many of the captains of
industry were steering their boats by looking at their wakes rather than by looking
forward. Seemingly mesmerized by their recent achievements, they appeared
unable to see the coast ahead, and the dangers that lay in pursuing “last quarter
plus more” goals through strategies that were not reconsidered—even in the face
of a rapidly deteriorating economic environment.
Leadership Psychology

In the years 1993-2008, with a blip in 2001-02, we were living in a growing economy,
albeit one fuelled by increased personal indebtedness. Many in the financial
services industry, especially in investment banking and related fields, got so used
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to success that they could not envisage failure. Overconfidence and hubris12
among investment bankers in the period up to 2008 was endemic—they felt
invulnerable, superhuman and beyond the reach of even the most fundamental
laws of economics. One commentator suggested it might be a necessary trait
for investment bankers. Any demonstrated lack of confidence would be fatal
for their performance.13 This same overconfidence that made them certain of
things for their clients made it difficult or impossible for them to discern danger
signals from their external vantage points.
There is considerable evidence that many of the executive teams
of enterprises that got themselves into trouble exhibited high levels
You must learn to listen
of groupthink. This form of collective hubris is well-recognized as a
to vague whispers. People
condition that develops in highly successful teams. It is characterized
will not come storming into
by illusions of invulnerability, unanimity, rationality and morality.14
your office saying, “There’s
a hell of a problem here.”
Highly cohesive and successful teams tend to believe that they can
TORONTO
never lose, that everyone on the team believes the same things, that
their actions and decisions are totally rational and that what they are
The financial system is
difficult. It is very easy to
doing is right, proper and ethical. Teams subject to groupthink tend
go from what you do today
to denigrate or belittle those who tell them they are wrong, stereotype
to something a little more
those who oppose them, and construe all information selectively
aggressive. It’s a slight shade
of grey. These slight shades
to reinforce their existing perceptions. They become unreceptive to
of grey are difficult to identify
criticism and unaware they are blocking danger signals. They keep
individually, but after a while
people with dissenting views at a distance so that they will not have to
it is easy to see that they are
either black or white.
deal with any dissonance between their beliefs and others’ viewpoints.
LONDON (U.K.)
Loyal dissenters self-censor to avoid being thought of as somehow not
“on the team” or “with the program.”
In the technology sector,
you are always expecting
Conversely, those who agree with the group find ready
something to change,
acceptance of their views. Accordingly, those who saw no risk in the
to disrupt; by comparison,
credit buildup found reinforcement in the words and actions of U.S.
in traditional businesses,
there is complacency and a
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, who was continually
sense of invulnerability from
issuing calming statements in speeches and congressional testimony.
being successful for so long.
He dismissed the “irrational exuberance” of the housing and stock
NEW YORK
markets as items of little concern, espousing the belief that risk in the
financial markets would be managed by the market system and the
self-interest of financial institutions. He held this view right up to the end of his
term in office and for some considerable period after.
In general, people tend to have “mental maps” about the ways in
which things work and they accept information that fits their maps and reject
information that doesn’t fit. What this means is that if someone believes that
house prices will always go up—because they have never seen them go down—
they will discount information that they have gone down. They will tend to view
that information as an aberration, faulty, or unreliable and reject it. This often
makes people insensitive to information that suggests that their business
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models may be faulty. Their “radars” are unreceptive to signals that suggest
they should reevaluate their route and consider changing course.
There is also considerable anecdotal evidence that social conformity
played a role in suppressing dissent within some organizations. This is the
desire to go along with those whom you like and respect, even if you believe that
their actions are wrong. This subconscious desire to conform—the distaste for
rocking the boat—leads people to ignore wrongdoing or accept inaction in the
face of events that call for action. It is hard to swim against the tide of opinion
when people you like and respect hold those opinions.
That so many decisions taken at the most senior levels in financial
and other organizations seem, in retrospect, ludicrous, is testimony to the
power of these distorting phenomena. They have been taught in undergraduate
and graduate programs in psychology and business for decades, and are
also frequently referred to in popular books dealing with flawed
They always asked me what
business and public sector decisions.15 Clearly, however, many players
keeps me awake at night.
simply did not recognize that they, too, could be victims of these effects.
I remember that somewhere
I would include in my answer,
It is a perverse reality that individuals can recognize overconfidence
“… what keeps me awake at
as a problem yet be so overconfident themselves they believe they could
night is (quantitative) models.”
not be victims of it! These are normal, not pathological, processes
HONG KONG
which is what makes them so insidious.
Reliance on Quantitative Models

In good times a lot of
sins are encouraged and
perpetuated. In 2007, a lot
of people were saying, “Isn’t
it amazing how great things
are?” Our CEO said “Yeah,
I haven’t felt this good since
the summer before the
Long-Term Capital crisis.
We woke up.”

Many leaders depended on quantitative models to guide their assessment
of risk, not recognizing many of the assumptions built into these models.
Post-crisis analysis of these models revealed the modellers had not
contemplated a prolonged and severe drop in house prices, presumably
because this had never happened in their living memories. In other
words, the models were deficient.16 They were sophisticated, arguably
NEW YORK
more complete and better tested than any that had gone before but—as
with all models—they were bounded by assumptions. And the assumptions
were wrong. This is exactly what had happened in the buildup and collapse
of Long-Term Capital Management a decade previously. Incomplete models,
tested with limited data, had given a false sense of security to investors
and policy-makers alike.
It doesn’t help, of course, that many of these models depended on
a level of mathematics skills simply not possessed by those in senior executive
ranks, and that the modellers came with impressive credentials. Many were
PhDs from the finest schools and, by the time the crisis erupted, they had
impressive resumes listing successes with their models. It took skeptical and
courageous people to say: “If I don’t understand it, I’m not going to believe it”
and force the modellers to explain their assumptions and the sensitivities in
their models. Some leaders did this. Whether or not they truly understood in
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technical terms the deficiencies of the models, they recognized the limitations
of these quantitative risk-management models in general. These leaders
used them as guides, but let common sense and judgment prevail. Here again,
there were precedents that pointed out the limitations of such models in
assessing risk in financial markets that should have warned people about
their inherent dangers.17
Organization Design

Poor organizational structure also contributed to poor risk management.
Giant financial conglomerates, such as Citigroup, AIG, ING and RBS, were so
badly damaged in the financial meltdown because they ignored a simple rule
of organizational design. Naval architects build large ships with watertight
compartments so a breach in the hull will not sink the ship. This principle
should have been followed by all financial institutions—especially those with
low-risk and high-risk components, such as universal banks and insurance
companies. Some small subsidiaries of financial giants, such as the
Financial Products group at AIG and the Dillon Read subsidiary of
It is incredibly important for
UBS, were allowed to take on risk that threatened to bring down their
businesses to invest in proper
infrastructure, proper risk
parent organizations.18 Their parent companies made three pertinent
management and to
errors. They:
centralize risk… if you look at
n did not consolidate risk at the top corporate levels;
some of the failures… you
had regional businesses who
n had inadequate risk reporting and controls; and,
were doing whatever they
n devolved risk management responsibilities in irresponsible ways.
wanted to do and there was
no oversight.

There is a strong argument for running different types of
businesses in largely autonomous divisions, or in subsidiary companies,
with their own boards. Such organizational structures increase the
degree of differentiation in variables that could be extremely important to
customers and shareholders. However, it creates a problem when the
independent subsidiaries or divisions have very different risk profiles in their
businesses but the total risk is borne by the parent company, unless that risk
is identified ahead of time, managed centrally, and monitored in real time.
Our research showed many companies did this well and had set up formal
structures, systems and processes to ensure this happened. Others had blended
risk models that blurred the responsibility and accountability for risk-taking,
not just in a legal sense, but also in ways that encouraged risk-taking by small
subsidiaries that could not carry the consequences of those risks.

HONG KONG

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Some organizations had strong risk-management cultures and others had
risk-taking cultures. By “culture” we refer both to shared values among
decision-makers and to the organizational systems and processes that ensured
those values reflected appropriate policies, processes and practices.
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Some organizations had cultures within which individuals or groups
that sensed or had reasons to believe excessive or unmanaged risks were being
taken by individuals or groups within their organizations, could speak up and
be listened to by their colleagues and senior managers. Leaders in these
organizations deliberately established and valued cultures of constructive dissent
within which freedom of thought and dissent were not just tolerated but
welcomed as part of the decision-making process. Emergent decisions may
not have pleased everyone but everyone believed they had the opportunity to
shape them. In sharp contrast, some organizations discouraged criticism no
matter how constructive it was. Some senior executives and CEOs reportedly
exercised excessive and intimidating control over those who might question
their risk-taking actions or their inaction in managing the risks taken by others.
Opposition was seen as not being “on the team.” Those who continued to
oppose were faced with sanctions ranging from dismissal to marginalization
and social ostracism.
A strong and widely shared risk-management culture was
identified as a critical governance mechanism, especially in complex,
multi-tiered organizations in which top management could never be
It is essential to create a
expected to be close to activities in subsidiaries. The CEO of one multiculture that is open and
tiered, complex financial holding company stated that the combination
honest so that the leaders
of culture and the integrity of people in key roles was the only way in
are in touch with what is
happening in the organization.
which they could manage risk within that organization. It had served
If you asked a difficult question
them very well during the financial crisis. There was much discussion
or if you were a contrarian,
you were decimated… you
in our research focus groups about the role of leaders in creating,
were thrown out.
nurturing and sustaining corporate cultures of constructive dissent by
TORONTO
modelling the required behaviours and personally walking the talk.
Compensation

Compensation became the focal point of media criticism during and after the
financial meltdown, especially when governments started bailing out banks
and insurance companies and members of the general public first became
aware of how much money the heads and senior executives of these
organizations were making. Not surprisingly, the amount of pay, the way that
it was earned and in what form it was paid, proved to be topics of interest in
our research focus groups and generated considerable discussion.
When it comes to the amount of executive pay, our research groups
tended to take a market perspective, accepting that high pay was a reality
in some types of businesses such as investment banking, hedge fund
management and private equity. Attempts to place a value on jobs or work are
usually fruitless. The price is what the market is prepared to pay. Further, there
was great concern that if governments attempted to control price, talented
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people would seek jurisdictions in which this would not happen and there would
be a flight of talent from those where governments intervened. While this seems
logical, there is in fact a dearth of empirical evidence to show that this happens.
There is some sense that people within the financial sector are using this
argument to forestall income controls and taxes on profits and bonuses by
revenue-hungry governments.19
Our participants expressed greater concern about the relationship
between financial incentive plans and risk-taking that was inconsistent with
creating shareholder value, and that might lead to a highly unstable financial
system. There were some compensation systems that incentivized and
rewarded performance by individuals and teams to the detriment of the rest of
their organizations. The story of AIG is classic. Here a very small group of
people, those in the financial products group, perhaps no more than 100 in all,
jeopardized the financial integrity of the entire corporation by building a large,
lucrative but incredibly risky business, which committed the firm’s capital base
and more.20 When this business blew up, the whole company almost
went with it. It was only a massive infusion of capital by the federal
I see the biggest issue as
governance around how
government that enabled AIG to satisfy the counterparty risks it had
people are being incentivized.
taken on through derivatives contracts, that kept the “good” parts of
It’s no surprise that Goldman
the company—its excellent insurance operations—alive.
Sachs did well because they
operate as a partnership; that
The compensation driving the housing bubble—widely perceived
makes a difference. When you
as
the
precursor
to the financial/economic problems—was not just at
have your own objectives
the
executive
level
but, rather, at the level of sales people who were
aligned with the objectives of
the shareholders, you’re fine.
rewarded for generating mortgages and leases from people who would
LONDON (U.K.)
never have been able to service their debts when growth and interest
rates normalized. Financial incentive plans played a huge role in driving
the sub-prime lending market, the securitization of those mortgages and the
design and distribution of derivatives based on those securities.
A great deal of executive and non-executive compensation was based
on short-term operating results and paid in cash, rather than on long-term
profit performance, paid in equity (stock, restricted stock or options), which
would vest over time. There were few, if any, claw-back provisions in
compensation systems that would kick in for poor judgment in risk management.
These issues have been addressed in various pieces of legislation in different
countries, developed and announced in response to publicity surrounding the
many compensation schemes in Wall Street and City firms in 2008. Some of
these compensation schemes resulted in government-provided TARP (Troubled
Asset Relief Program) funds being used to pay million-dollar-plus bonuses to
managers and executives of firms that had lost billions of dollars in capital.
Participants also discussed the ways in which pay acted as an incentive
when those receiving the pay were already rich beyond belief. Perhaps money
was valued as a symbol of “winning” in an intensely competitive world of ultra-
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competitive people. The public declaration of compensation was a scorecard
against which egos could be compared. One tentative hypothesis derived from
this research is that some people become addicted to money in the same
way an alcoholic needs a drink or a drug-abuser needs a fix. Perhaps it is this
addiction that makes people in the investment business so resistant to the
public scorn that follows their actions and, therefore, so willing to return to their
old compensation practices as soon as possible.
Traditionally, boards of directors have dealt with executive compensation
as a “human resources” issue rather than a risk variable. Boards, and
their committees, commission studies of compensation in identified
In a company such as this
you can’t control people
“competitor” firms. They assess both the quantum of compensation,
through policies, procedures
and the way it is earned and paid, from the perspective of attracting,
and policing. You can only
retaining and motivating their people, especially their top talent.
do it through a strong risk
management culture and
This research indicates executive teams and boards of directors
absolute integrity in all leaders.
need to spend more time and effort understanding the behavioural risk
MONTREAL
implications of all compensation plans (not just those for executives),
for a variety of behaviours, well beyond the narrow dimensions of
This is a disgrace to society
attraction, retention and motivation to perform. When compensation
that we are in this position.
We are missing a layer of
practices encourage risk-taking rather than risk management, neither
leadership that has the ability
shareholders nor society are well served.
to understand and deal with
the global village.
Corporate Governance

LONDON (U.K.)

This financial meltdown and recession ironically came hard on the heels
The financial industry is
of the biggest reforms in corporate governance in the modern history
the heart of the economy.
of business, with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S. and
It has to pump. If it is in
trouble, it affects us all.
similar reforms in other developed countries. Despite this legislation,
Companies should stress test
clearly the boards of many companies that failed, or nearly failed,
their boards and leadership
did little to restrain their managements. Buoyed by years of stellar
teams. Take a board that
thinks they are well informed,
financial performance and the allure of more to come, many boards
well connected, etc. and see
became complacent and careless, creating the perfect conditions for
how they perform under
imaginative financial engineers to create even more difficult-to-understand
stress. It could be
a big wake-up call.
products, and for traders to benefit from the merry-go-round. Then the
CALGARY
music stopped.
This was far from a universal problem. In those companies
that avoided the worst effects of the economic and financial crisis there was
excellent governance. Boards were vigilant and diligent in monitoring risk
exposure and pressing for strong risk-management policies, procedures
and practices.
Directors are, of course, subject to some of the same pressures to
pursue profitable growth as managers and, since they are largely drawn from
the ranks of successful executives, we should expect them to think similarly to
those they govern. But they should have a wider perspective and longer time
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horizon. They also typically do not have similar compensation pressures since
they are paid by retainer or share-based plans, rather than options and bonuses.
The challenge for boards was, and still is, two-fold:
First, few directors had the requisite competencies to assess the risk
their companies were taking in their exposure to complex financial instruments.
Their understanding of risk in complex systems was almost certainly less deep
and less contemporary than the managements of the firms they were governing
(and we have already suggested the managements were lacking in many of
these competencies).
Second, the conventional structure and process of governance creates
dependency on the CEO who sits astride the channels of communication to the
board, and controls much of the messaging to the board. When this happens,
board members must trust their CEO absolutely. From published accounts, it
seems this trust became blind faith within several financial companies.
Boards could and should have multiple information sources and they
must demand data that is not buffed and polished by the CEO to impress or
manipulate the board into doing the CEO’s bidding. They can play a leading role
in ensuring CEOs’ goals address more than short-term financial performance
and extend to the establishment of a corporate culture and processes that
address both risk and returns.
They have the tools to do so through appropriate board committees
and the internal audit function that reports directly to the board or one of its
committees. They have the opportunity to do so by challenging the assumptions
of management and requiring exposure to a variety of executives and specialists
within the companies they govern rather than relying exclusively on the CEO.
They must, of course, have the will to do this even if it is uncomfortable.
Similarly, several money centre banks found that subsidiaries or
departments with relatively few people were betting the capital of the firm on
securities whose fundamentals were weak, such as CDOs and SIVs. Senior
leaders of these institutions were genuinely shocked when they realized they
had allowed this to happen. Even after several years of extraordinary profits
from these small business units, they had not realized extraordinary risks were
almost certainly being taken to produce the rewards. Cynics believe they wilfully
closed their eyes to the source of these profits. That may be the case. Certainly,
the leadership of these institutions had become very careless in their supervisory
or oversight roles.21
Learning

Most disconcerting and critical for our future is the apparent failure to learn
from previous financial crises, many of which were similar to the recent one.
Excessive leverage buildup, uncontrolled asset bubbles, non-transparent
risk exposure through derivatives and structured investment vehicles, and
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excessive dependence on quantitative models have all been elements of
previous financial meltdowns.
In many respects, the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM) in 1998 provided a dress rehearsal for the recent market meltdown.22, 23
LTCM was an unregulated hedge fund founded by acknowledged experts in
quantitative analysis, including two Nobel Laureates in Economics. From its
start in 1994 to its prime in August 1998, the fund amassed assets of more than
$100 billion, most borrowed from American, German, Swiss and other banks.
More significant, however, was that the firm had used complex derivatives and
very high leverage. By 1998, it had more than $1 trillion of exposure in the
marketplace. It rapidly became the darling of Wall Street and main-line banks
around the world fell over themselves to lend to and invest in it. Some even
launched their own imitative funds.
Then LTCM ran into trouble. It began losing money—lots of it.
By September 1998, it had lost more than 45 per cent of its peak capital
in less than four months due to yield-curve arbitrage, swaps and equity
If people get a chance to make
volatility, trades in developed countries, trades on foreign currency and
a lot of money, they sometimes
do not care who they step over
arbitrage in junk bonds. It owed a great deal of money to other financial
to get there. You are never
institutions, whose own capital bases were being threatened by the
going to wrestle greed to the
insolvency of LTCM. The heads of the Federal Reserve and New York
ground. It wasn’t a financial
crisis. This was a collapse of
Federal Reserve Bank believed that if LTCM was allowed to fail—which
values. It comes down to
seemed quite certain in September 1998—there would likely be a
character; comes down to
ethics. Greed is too soft a
massive dislocation in the financial markets and credit seize-ups. The
word. There is an addiction to
U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve feared this would plunge America
money and it is fuelled by the
and other parts of the world into recession. Although a small company
availability of debt.
in numbers of employees and clients, because of its huge leverage,
VANCOUVER
LTCM was deemed "too big to fail.” The Federal Reserve arranged for a
very reluctant group of investment and money centre banks (including Bankers
Trust, Chase Manhattan, Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs and other American
and European financial institutions) to rescue it, without requiring an injection of
government capital. Notably, Bear Stearns refused to participate in this rescue,
a fact that may have influenced the decision by other financial institutions not to
come to Bear Stearns’ rescue when it was in trouble in 2008.
The government had to take dramatic action to increase liquidity in
the market place by slashing interest rates. It was widely recognized, and even
admitted, by the then Chairman of the Federal Reserve, that a moral hazard
had been created by this action. While partners and employees of LTCM lost
personal paper fortunes that were reinvested in the firm, senior people walked
away with millions in bonuses and severance payments and resumed careers
on Wall Street, founded other funds or went back to teaching and consulting
on risk management.
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The public policy lessons from LTCM’s rise and fall were clear and
well-documented. We believe if they had been learned and applied, much would
be different today:
n We would not have had the credit buildup and financial meltdown
of 2003-09.
n Derivatives development and trading would have been within the
purview of regulators and made transparent.
n There would have been more financial services regulation, not less.
n Government regulators would have focused on preventing financial
crises, rather than staging dramatic rescues to fix things after they
had happened.
n And there would have been much tighter regulation of the ways in
which firms used capital.
None of these lessons appeared to have been learned. In fact, the
Federal Reserve took the view through the asset bubble of 2003-07 that firms
in the market would regulate themselves despite historical evidence otherwise.
Even while commenting on the “irrational exuberance” that gripped
the stock market in 2005, Alan Greenspan, still Chairman of the
Yes, there will always be
crises, but in any crisis there
Federal Reserve and one of the key players in organizing the LTCM
are always organizations that
rescue, continued to pump more liquidity into the marketplace;
are not caught up in the crisis
promote lower interest rates and easier credit; make more money
because the leaders of those
organizations have surrounded
available to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae; and do nothing about
themselves with the right
regulating
derivatives, hedge funds or private equity firms. Overwhelming
people or brought the right
faith in efficient markets, rational behaviour, mathematical models
judgment or considered the
longer term implications of
and diversification ruled supreme.
what they are doing.
Nor did many of the firms that rescued LTCM appear to learn
TORONTO
much from that experience. Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and UBS
were among many financial institutions that experienced major losses
through their involvement with LTCM in 1998 and did the same in 2008. Today,
the moral hazard from rescuing companies that get into trouble remains a
major concern for policy-makers, politicians and regulators around the world.
They recognize there are financial institutions indeed “too big to fail” that must
be rescued and therefore contribute to the creation of moral hazard. There is,
as yet, no consensus about what should be done about this.
Some people, certainly many of our research participants, paid
attention to historical events and learned from them. In one session, for
example, a senior executive pointed out his firm had decided to de-risk its
operations after a partner had said, early in 2007, that “he had never felt so
good since the weekend before Long-Term Capital Management had blown-up.”
This prompted a discussion; other partners had looked at the LTCM history
and concluded a similar sequence of events might well occur in the near-future;
and, the firm began to de-risk its operations.
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Social Responsibility

In one of our research sessions, a senior international investment banking
executive started his comments with the statement: “We should be ashamed of
what we have done!” The room went silent as he described a company that had
acted with little or no consciousness of the consequences of its actions, let
alone a sense of corporate social responsibility. He was genuinely remorseful
and many in the room were impressed by his observations and conclusions.
Our research exposed the continuing debate about the social
responsibility of business. Most participants in the research discussions had
been exposed to recent thinking about corporate social responsibility (CSR)
and were aware it was increasingly important in business school curricula.
Some were from companies that had taken strong stands with respect to
some aspects of CSR, such as environmental stewardship, diversity
enhancement, civil and human rights, and support of the arts. Some research
participants continue to believe business leaders should not concern
themselves with social responsibility issues even in light of consequences
resulting from the financial meltdown and “Great Recession.”
Although our research was qualitative rather than quantitative,
our sample divided into three clear groups.
Your ultimate score in
One group was emphatic that business leaders weren’t
society is going to be what
responsible to anyone other than shareholders, provided they did not
you leave behind for other
break laws or regulations. If what they did before, during and after the
generations and how you
crisis was within the law and its associated regulations that was just fine have affected other people.
TORONTO
by them. If their judgment was wrong, their markets and shareholders
would punish them accordingly.
A second group took a diametrically opposite point of view. This group
felt business leaders have a duty to shareholders, employees, customers,
suppliers and the broader societies within which they operate and have a
responsibility to balance these interests to the best of their ability. Some in
this group even proposed heads of global banks are responsible to the whole
capitalist system and that the failure of people in such positions to act
responsibly had undermined this system, perhaps irreparably.
The third group took the view that, in the long run, acting in a socially
responsible manner is in the interest of businesses and there was, therefore,
nothing to argue about!
These three perspectives permeate most discussions about corporate
social responsibility in recent years and we readily recognize the different
perspectives around this issue. We were surprised that many people in the
financial services industry still seem reluctant to recognize that failure to act
in a socially responsible way during the last decade has unleashed a raft of
legislation and regulation that will depress profits in this industry for years to
come, perhaps forever.24 Being socially responsible would have been both the
right thing and smart thing to do.
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Leadership Character

In the view of many participants in our research discussions, character
determined the extent to which business leaders pursued high-risk growth
strategies in response to the investor community’s relentless pursuit of “more”
and the compensation schemes encouraging them. Discussions about character
tended to focus on three components: virtues and vices, values, and traits.
In the rush to identify “the” cause of the financial system collapse,
many in our study as well as in the mass media were quick to propose that it
was the greed of consumers, mortgage brokers, bankers, and others that drove
financial leverage to unsustainable heights. Greed (avarice, covetousness, desire
for material gain or wealth, without concern for others’ individual or
collective needs) was certainly identified as an important factor by
When leaders start
compromising on core
participants in our research study, but it did not stand alone. People
values it gets magnified
referred to the other six “deadly sins” as well—pride (excessive belief in
throughout the organization.
one's own abilities, over-confidence, hubris), sloth (laziness, not doing
VANCOUVER
one’s homework), envy (desire for what others have), lust (extravagance
or unrestrained excess), gluttony (swallowing too much, literally or
So, how aware are you
of where that bright line is
metaphorically) and wrath (anger at being exposed, leading to denial
and how do you deal with that
of culpability, thereby impeding learning).
in a complex environment?
We would add another trait to this traditional list. While
It comes back around to that
concept of judgment and
competitiveness is a virtue that one looks for in business leaders, like
that concept of conviction
many virtues it can become a vice when carried to excess. There is
and competence.
evidence that hyper-competitiveness was rampant among many in
TORONTO
the financial community and that this led to at least some of the most
We seem to lack a moral
irresponsible risk-taking that ran many firms into deep trouble.
compass that helps us to
It is certainly a better explanation of why people at the top of these
make the right decision when
organizations pressed for such incredibly high compensation packages
the reward system is such
that we are encouraged to
even though they were already personally wealthy. It was less about
trade the future for the present.
getting more than it was about getting more than the other person
NEW YORK
was getting!
Many research participants talked about the virtues of good
leaders who did not get caught up in the excesses of the last few years, and who
had the courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance and sense of proportionality
that allowed them to steer clear of investments based on dubious collateral or
over-engineered financial instruments with unclear recourse. They also talked
about the courage these leaders demonstrated in the extended run-up to the
financial crisis when many of them lagged their competitors in financial returns
and share price performance and were roundly criticized for this.
Personality traits were also cited as playing a role in why leaders
appreciated or failed to appreciate the reality of what was happening around
them. Narcissism, hedonism and arrogance distort perception while humility,
patience, deliberateness and other traits tend to make leaders listen to and
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appreciate others’ perspectives and consider the consequences of their decisions
carefully. We suspect also that it was differences in personal or corporate values,
personality traits, or a different sense of accountability and responsibility to their
shareholders and clients that made the difference between those that went
along with the crowd and those that did not.
Invariably, discussions about character, virtues and vices, traits
and values led to discussion of the question, “Can character be taught?”
There were many strong views expressed about this, with some arguing
character is formed in early years by both nature and nurture. By
I came to the conclusion the
crisis involved a collapse of
early adulthood, it is what it is. Others took the view that, while the
values. It was all about making
early years are obviously critical, there were many opportunities to
money as fast as you could
help shape character and encourage development of virtuous
and all of the accoutrements
that came along with it. And it
behaviours throughout one’s life. Clearly many respondents believed
did not seem important how
the values celebrated or censured in their management education programs
you made money. It did not
and manifested by their early-career mentors, managers and leaders
seem important whether you
were building for the long term.
had impacted their own mature value-frameworks.
VANCOUVER

Leadership Education and Development

Humility is essential to good

This was a sobering research experience for those of us involved in
leadership. In the energy
industry, you get handed
leadership education and development. In polite but forceful ways we
humility quite often. In a very
were accused of curriculum deficiencies, of not addressing issues
cyclical business, we see the
of character and leadership commitment when teaching leadership
downturns more frequently.
At $4 for gas, you learn quickly
competencies, not equipping graduates and younger leaders with the
how difficult it can be. Humility
ability to learn from history, and not inspiring them to become lifelong
keeps you real as a leader.
25
learners. One editorial in The Economist went so far as to suggest that
CALGARY
business schools “churn out jargon-spewing economic vandals” and
that we need to completely reform our programs and processes.
There has been a move
toward finding independent
In the various research group discussions, specific deficiencies
directors and there is more
were identified in the areas of systems thinking, understanding complex
training going on. However,
systems, exposure to economic and social history that addresses the
there has not yet been a solid
causes and consequences of previous economic crises, and over-reliance base for directors to speak
their mind and not fear being
on quantitative methodologies. Some mentioned we had spent insufficient
excluded from the group.
time and effort to help people get in touch with their values, to
TORONTO
legitimize values as an important element of business decision-making
and to help people develop skills they need to be effective advocates for an
opposing position.
There was also a sense that as business educators we have minimized
the importance of strategic analysis, risk assessment, contingency planning
and scenario exploration. Within companies, this type of “external” analysis has
been restricted to so few people—the strategic planning group, for example—
that most next-generation leaders were not getting exposure to this way of
thinking. The comments about risk management were quite explicit, suggesting
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that management educators and leadership developers had fragmented the
discussion of risk to such an extent that its overall impact on the organization
was lost. They called for a more integrated perspective on risk and a higher
level of proficiency in risk assessment and management.
Our research participants had varying views on the role and
responsibilities of educators and how we could make a difference. There was
some skepticism and cynicism. Many pointed out these issues had been
identified and discussed before. They had taken courses and programs that
focused on leadership, corporate responsibility, ethics and values. They pointed
out that people who were actually involved in the companies that failed had
also done so. They asserted that people were and will always be motivated by
self-interest; the rewards were and always will be huge in industries
Doctors, lawyers and
such as investment banking; and clever people will always find
accountants know about
ingenious ways of making themselves rich no matter what the rules
the standards of acceptable
behaviour that they need to
and regulations. It was naïve to expect them to do otherwise. Crises
live up to. I am not sure that
like these have happened before, will happen again, and people say
business schools create that
they will learn from them but they don’t.
same standard among their
graduates. I think that leads
Others were skeptical about the ability to make significant
to a lot of problems with
differences
through education but felt it was worth trying. They often
integrity and character.
talked
from
their own experiences, pointed out situations that had
TORONTO
occurred earlier in their lives, whether in school or in early corporate
The one thing that I think
roles that had made a difference to them when properly addressed and
every professional school
when they had been forced or encouraged to reflect on them. Discussion
should offer—and certainly
of ethical issues and the social responsibility of business have to be
the business schools perhaps
need some additional focus
raised somewhere and universities and business schools are the
on—is how to build
right place to address them. They believed such discussions will not
character and integrity
change everyone’s views, but might change some views and at least
into decision-making.
make those who are resistant to this line of thinking aware that
TORONTO
others disagree. This view is consistent with a lot of the research
and writing in academic literature.26
Many were optimistic about the chances of making a difference,
especially with next-generation leaders. They thought young people today are
more idealistic than previous generations. They believed that if business and
management schools focused as much on leadership character as they did on
building competencies and if curriculum changed to address many of the issues
exposed in this recent crisis, it would make a significant difference to enough
people to lessen the chances of a recurrence. They felt business and management
schools should try to influence those open to being influenced. However, even
these optimists tempered their outlook by recognizing that it is the post-graduate
experiences in companies that really shape the behaviours of management and
executives and, if continual learning and role modelling within the workplace
did not reinforce early learning, it was unlikely to influence behaviours.
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RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS

We believe people involved in these group discussions were candid, introspective,
thoughtful and honest in their observations and revelations about “what went
wrong.” They dug deeply into their own experiences, their personal involvement
in leadership roles, their inside knowledge and their opinions. They provided
insights into leadership at those companies that performed poorly during this
crisis and those that thrived. The richness of their contributions could not have
been elicited through any other research methodology.
We left sessions convinced there is an opportunity to build on their
observations, add our own insights and subject-matter expertise, and improve
the practice of leaders today and tomorrow.
This research has shown that failures in leadership played a role in
the financial and economic crisis of the past few years. The failures were not
universal. They affected some organizations and not others. They were at the
very centre of the financial system but also at its periphery. They occurred in
companies that were in the Main Street and Wall Street economies.
Our research indicated failures of three types.
There were failures of competence, especially in the areas of
environmental analysis, risk management, and the creation of organizational
structures, culture, systems and processes to identify, manage and control risk.
There were failures of character demonstrated in the values, absence
of virtues and personality traits of some in leadership positions.
Finally, there were failures in the commitment to good leadership—the
commitment to do the real, gritty, hard work of leadership that is involved in the
governance of large and complex organizations while, at the same time, both
accepting and living up to their responsibilities to the communities and societies
within which they operated.
By contrast, there were many leadership successes—organizations
whose leaders saw what was coming, who led their organizations in ways that
avoided the dangers, and in some cases took advantage of the opportunities
that were created in the aftermath of the crisis.
In the next section, we link these findings with what we know about
good leaders—what they do, who they are, how they become leaders and how
organizations can develop good leaders. To this end, we provide a broad set of
concepts and principles that we believe will equip current and next-generation
leaders with the opportunity to make a real difference through good leadership.
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Good Leadership
THE ENORMITY OF THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL MELTDOWN AND ECONOMIC CRISIS CONVINCED

us of the need to revisit how we think and talk about leadership and specifically
what we should do as educators to develop the next generation of business leaders.
In this section, we step beyond the examination of leadership within the
narrow confines of this recent crisis to broadly address leadership principles
and practices that appear to be important in an uncertain, turbulent and rapidly
changing business world. We think the challenges for future leaders will be
greater than they have been in the past. Globalization, increased complexity,
unstable geopolitics, the emergence of new economic powers and the very slow
growth of advanced economies will put great pressure on performance.
Additionally, competition for talent will increase in the face of an aging
workforce in all advanced economies.
We present our ideas under five major headings:
WHAT GOOD LEADERS DO: the essential roles and responsibilities of leaders
to ensure their organizations perform in the present while building for the future.
WHO GOOD LEADERS ARE: the competencies, character and commitment
required of good leaders, now and for the future.
HOW PEOPLE BECOME GOOD AND BETTER LEADERS: the actions that leaders
and those who aspire to leadership roles must take if they are to grow and
develop as leaders.
HOW GOOD LEADERS ARE DEVELOPED: what business organizations, leaders
and educators must do to develop next-generation leaders.
WHAT SOCIETIES EXPECT OF THEIR BUSINESS LEADERS: what they must
understand and appreciate about the demands of the societies within which
they operate if they are to be accepted and effective as leaders.
Many of these ideas are not revolutionary—they are timeless and
tested. However, the analysis of “what went wrong and what was done well”
in the financial and economic crisis suggests the gap between good principles
and actual practice was wide and costly.
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FIGURE 2:

What Good Leaders Do
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What Good Leaders Do
Good organizations recognize they need good leadership at all levels, not just
in the executive suite. Such leaders:
Analyze and make sense of the dynamic, rapidly changing and often
turbulent global and local economic, political, regulatory, societal and
technological environments within which they operate. They are particularly
sensitive to complex systems which may not be fully understandable but which
must be managed or accommodated if they are to be successful.
Formulate, develop, articulate and communicate effective integrated
strategies that achieve clearly defined goals consistent with the mission, vision
and values of their enterprises, business units, departments and teams. Such
strategies are based on opportunities, organizational core competencies and
fully leveraging the financial, organizational and human capital of the organization.
They take into account and integrate the interests of multiple stakeholders in
the enterprise.
Execute strategies brilliantly through effective utilization and alignment
of all elements of their organizations. They work with their followers to develop a
vision for the future. They align people, systems, processes, structure and culture.
Evaluate the outcome of these strategies systematically, in real time,
ensuring that assumptions are constantly checked for validity and stability. They
provide feedback to the strategic formulation process to ensure that strategies
remain current and optimized as the organizational environment changes.
Define and build the capabilities, capacity and culture they need to
perform in the uncertain futures into which they are guiding their organizations.
By capabilities, we mean the knowledge, understanding, skills and judgment
they need to be successful; by capacity, we refer to the numbers of people
having these capabilities and available for deployment against challenges; by
culture, we refer to the shared values and value-driven behaviours that enlist
people in a common vision, engaging them in individual and joint pursuit of
agreed-upon goals, encouraging them to strive for excellence, and empowering
them to achieve it.
Strive to perform in the present while building for the future. They do
not readily trade off short- and long-term goals but, rather, seek to achieve
both. This requires that they lead with their feet on the ground, their eyes on
the horizon and their imaginations beyond it.
Maintain a cross-enterprise perspective and collaborate effectively
across organizational boundaries in the interest of the total enterprise even
though they may be personally accountable and rewarded for the performance
of only part of it.
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FIGURE 3:

Who Good Leaders Are

Character

Values
Virtues

Competencies*

Commitment

Organizational
Competencies

People
Competencies

Traits

Aspiration
Engagement
Sacrifice

Intellect
Business
Competencies

Strategic
Competencies

*Competencies

54

Knowledge

Understanding

Skills

Judgment

Facts, figures,
concepts, etc.

Relationships,
context, significance,
materiality, etc.

Analyzing,
decision-making,
communicating,
getting things done,
teaming, etc.

Using intuition,
timing, methods
to use, who to
involve, how to
do it, etc.

GOOD LEADERSHIP

Who Good Leaders Are
The foundation of good leadership rests on three pillars: competencies,
character and commitment.
Competencies include the knowledge, understanding, skills and
judgment leaders are expected to have, if not early in their careers, at least in
their mature phases. These are typically acquired through formal education,
training, programs, and coaching and mentoring in the workplace, as well
as reflecting on their experiences and the implications for their performance
and development. Competencies determine what leaders are able to do.
Competencies may be broadly or narrowly based, thereby determining a
leader’s situational ability.
Character is fundamental to good leadership. It determines how
leaders see and interpret things and how they will react in different
circumstances; the criteria they will use for decisions; and how those decisions
will be implemented. While competencies can be learned, character is developed
both early in childhood and in later stages of life through critical formative
experiences and reflection on those experiences. Character influences what
leaders will do in different situations.
Commitment is critical. Not just commitment to take on a leadership
role, but commitment to do the challenging and rewarding work of leadership.
Without such commitment, leaders become figureheads or even obstacles to
performance and development. When commitment fades, leaders must be
prepared to step aside and hand the leadership reins to others. When leaders
sense loss of commitment by others, they must address this fundamental
leadership weakness.
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Competencies Count
Leaders must have intelligence or intellect as well as people, organizational,
business and strategic competencies. Such competencies are amalgams of
knowledge, understanding, skills and judgment.

FIGURE 4: COMPETENCIES COUNT
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INTELLIGENCE—INTELLECT

Good leaders are smart. They can cope with complexity and change. They
understand cause-and-effect relationships. They separate the material from
the trivial, the important from the unimportant. They think logically and frame
and express their thoughts clearly. They find the right stuff to read, the
programs to watch, and the experts to whom they should listen.
PEOPLE COMPETENCIES

Good leaders understand people—what makes them tick, how to create
motivated individuals and teams, factors impacting performance and the levers
to pull to increase performance. They recognize potential and actual barriers
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to accurate perception and interpretation of the changing world around them.
They recruit well or find people to recruit for them. They build and maintain
high-performance teams from diverse individuals with different backgrounds,
cognitive styles and perspectives. They understand when and how to collaborate
effectively to achieve superior outcomes. They understand good leaders sometimes
must be good followers, and they are prepared for this. Above all, they have high
levels of self-awareness.
ORGANIZATIONAL COMPETENCIES

Good leaders understand how their organizations work. They understand the
organization of their competitors, partners, customers and other stakeholders.
And they know how to work those organizations. They are politically astute
without being corporate politicians. They analyze who exercises influence,
persuasion and power in their organizations and how they do it, and then learn
to do it themselves. They understand the value of good organizational design
and how to align strategy, structure, systems, processes, culture and people.
BUSINESS COMPETENCIES

Good leaders have a deep, intimate knowledge of their businesses or functions,
if not at first, then shortly after becoming leaders. They understand how their
organizations make money and lose it. They understand the risks they are taking
on, how to get paid for taking those risks and how to avoid taking on risks they don’t
understand or get paid for. If they don’t know these things at the moment they
become leaders, they gather people around them who do and learn from them.
STRATEGIC COMPETENCIES

Good leaders have a strategic competence that enables them to understand how
to position their businesses for future opportunities and threats that may arise
from changes in economic, political, societal, technological and competitive
environments. They understand risks. They move easily between focusing on
today’s challenges and what lies on the horizon or beyond. They understand
systems thinking and are able to see the impact on others of actions taken to
address one issue. They use this strategic competence to chart the way forward
for the businesses or functions they run.
TEAM-BASED COMPETENCIES

In large, complicated or complex organizations, leaders may simply not be
able to know everything they need to know about their businesses or functions.
In this case, their people and organizational competencies should be used to
develop a team competence that allows them to supplement their own
competencies. These leaders are not ashamed of their ignorance in certain
functional areas and ask for help.
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DEVELOPING COMPETENCIES

While it is normal for leaders to excel on one or more of these competency
dimensions, it is unacceptable for them to be entirely deficient in even one
area if they are to function effectively at senior levels. Early identification of
developmental needs is critical to building leadership competencies in order
to increase strengths and overcome weaknesses that may turn out to be “fatal”
flaws at later career stages.
Character Matters
While competencies determine what leaders can do, leadership character
determines what they will do in different situations. Character can be expressed
as a set of virtues, values and traits.

FIGURE 5: CHARACTER MATTERS
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VIRTUES

Virtues are patterns of worthy behaviours including wisdom, courage, humanity,
justice, prudence, temperance, compassion, integrity, transcendence, and
accountability, each of which can be sub-divided into finer-grained behaviours.
The opposite of virtues are vices, or unworthy behaviours such as cowardice,
arrogance, recklessness or foolhardiness. In excess, many virtues become
vices—excessive courage may lead to foolhardiness, good judgment to boldness,
integrity to self-righteousness, and so on.
VALUES

Values are normative beliefs that influence or guide behaviours and many
values carry the same labels as the virtues described above. Values cannot be
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measured directly but are inferred from behaviours. They are usually associated
with words such as “should” or “ought,” as in “Leaders should have integrity,
transparency and compassion,” or, “Leaders ought to treat everyone with dignity
and respect,” or, “Leaders should be socially responsible.” Values, in this
context, refer to individual beliefs rather than “corporate values” though, clearly,
compatibility between the two results in better corporate and individual
outcomes than incompatibility.
TRAITS

Traits are other personality dimensions including openness, conscientiousness,
extroversion, agreeableness, emotional stability, neuroticism, hardiness,
resiliency, tolerance for ambiguity and creativity, all of which have been related
to leadership success and failure in much previous research. As with values,
traits shape virtues: “neurotic” individuals tend to be intemperate and
imprudent, conscientious people tend to be cautious, and so on.
CHARACTER AND LEADERSHIP

These virtues, values and traits have been incorporated into various sets by
leadership researchers.27 Many of these overlap, some are conceptually close
but have different labels, while others share the same label but are conceptually
distinct. It is less important that leaders or organizations adhere to one
formulation than that they recognize how central character is to leadership.
Those who can lead organizations in good times and bad, through
booms and busts, through a variety of ever-changing circumstances, may
display characteristics that, at first sight, seem paradoxical. They are confident
and humble, aggressive and patient, analytical and intuitive, principled and
pragmatic, deliberate and decisive, candid and compassionate. Demonstrating
behaviours consistent with seemingly opposed characteristics is a mark of the
“leader for all seasons,” unlike the more limited, “situation-specific leader”
who is more one-dimensional. Just as leaders may have a narrow or wide
competency bandwidth, they can have variable character bandwidth.
Character in its broadest sense impacts most, if not all, decisions
made in organizations. Character is formed through living, reflecting, receiving
feedback and criticism and refining one’s approach to living28, 29 but may also be
influenced by experiences in educational and work settings.
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Commitment is Critical
Alongside competencies and character is the commitment to do the hard
work of leadership and to continue to develop as a leader. Such commitment
is forged from individual aspirations, and the preparedness to be fully engaged
and make personal sacrifices in return for the opportunities and the rewards.
Good leaders will be committed to the good of the organization they serve and
the people who follow them rather than solely to their own self-benefit.

FIGURE 6: COMMITMENT IS CRITICAL
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ASPIRATION

The aspiration to do the hard work of leadership must be distinguished from
the desire to merely occupy the position of leader and enjoy the rewards and
privileges of rank. There are many who aspire to the latter but far fewer who are
really prepared for the continuous, unrelenting work of leadership, especially in
tough times when things are not going well.
ENGAGEMENT

Good leaders are engaged in the mission and vision of the organization, often
because they have had a role in formulating them. They are passionate about
what the organization does; they have deep, intimate knowledge about how it
works. They go the extra mile, take on the tough assignments, and do what’s
right for the organization, not necessarily what they would like to do for themselves.
SACRIFICE

Good leaders make sacrifices to attract, develop and retain good followers.
They share credit for achievements and shoulder responsibility for failure.
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They spend time developing the talents and careers of others when they are
short on time themselves. They give up conventional ideas about balanced
lifestyles and find creative ways to balance work, family and other commitments.
CONTINUOUS COMMITMENT

There often comes a time when leaders are no longer prepared to commit to
the hard work of leadership. This may be temporary or may reflect a more
permanent change in aspirations, desired levels of engagement or the degree
of sacrifice that effective leadership requires. Those who recognize this state in
themselves must act to yield their leadership roles to others who are prepared
to take on the challenge. Those who see it in others who may not be conscious
of it must intervene to prompt this realization. When leaders no longer want to
lead, leadership must change for the sake of both performance and continuity
of leadership development.
Learning and Leading
Learning and leading go hand-in-hand and must be pursued at individual,
group and organizational levels.
INDIVIDUAL LEARNING

Good leaders learn from every experience they have had and from any leader
they’ve seen in action, good or bad. They learn from peers, people who report
to them, competitors, partners and suppliers. They learn from their critics
and their allies. But, in order to learn, they must be motivated and have the
capability to learn.
Not every leader is good at learning or is prepared to constantly learn.
Leaders may have personality traits that prevent them from being open to new
ideas. They may lack the courage to move outside their comfort zones. They
may lack the humility essential for learning or be overconfident, which leads to
arrogance. They may be narcissistic and surround themselves with people who
will not even suggest they ought to be learning something new for fear of
displeasing them. They may simply lack the intellect to learn.
Leaders may get lazy about learning, believing that they have reached
the peak of their learning curves and have no more to learn. This may be a
psychologically comfortable space but it is one that prevents leaders improving,
and will eventually lead to their underperformance and obsolescence. Good
leaders never stop learning. At higher levels in the organization they find
themselves learning how to lead when the path ahead is unclear. This is a
different type of learning than the mastery of a syllabus or body of known
concepts, facts and skills. It requires an even greater cognitive bandwidth
because much of what they must learn will be incongruent with the mental
maps they have formed that previously guided them to success.
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FIGURE 7:

Learning and Leading
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GROUP LEARNING

When leaders show others they are learning themselves, when they recognize
learning is taking place, when they sponsor and personally attend learning
events, they send signals that, when repeated often enough, become part of
the organization’s culture. When they work with other organizations in, say,
the context of an industry group, they demonstrate their openness to learning.
When leaders openly declare that they have discovered someone, somewhere is
doing something better than they are doing it, and are keen to figure out how
they can improve, they are shaping a learning culture for their organizations. As
well, when they promote learners and pass over or remove those who believe
they know it all, they are reinforcing that culture.
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

Senior leaders can establish mechanisms, processes and policies that support
learning… or not. A leader can decide whether learning is a strategic imperative
or a “nice to have” and how much is spent on learning initiatives. A leader can
decide what gets cut when budgets are tight and determine the organizational
status of a function such as talent development. Leaders can require that
personal development programs involving learning are either integrated into
career or succession management or positioned as discretionary. They can be
potent promoters of identifying and disseminating best practices within their
organizations, or they can take a more passive role and let it happen. They have
a determining role in developing the type of learning culture, processes and
policies that their organizations will implement.
Becoming Better Leaders
While the concept of “the born leader” may be attractive and suggests that good
leadership is just a function of natural selection, for most people leadership is
learned. Leaders tend to evolve along maturation pathways that may differ from
one leader to another, but also have some common elements:
PERFORMING

To become a leader, it is essential to demonstrate that you can perform at
a high level in your chosen field as an individual contributor. This need to
demonstrate performance ability is required at all stages of the leadershipdevelopment process.
RISKING

Leaders take risks with their personal careers. Not stupid, foolhardy or extreme
risks, but pushing for new challenges, volunteering for the tough and sometimes
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unpleasant assignments that lead to learning, and making themselves visible
by stating their desire for more challenging leadership roles. Some of this
learning will come by failing and understanding how to manage that failure.
Some will come from success, and learning how to handle that, too.
STRETCHING

Leaders are constantly stretching, reaching for new performance levels and
innovative and creative ways of contributing more to their organizations. They don’t
rest on their laurels, hunker down in their comfort zones, and become complacent.
LEARNING

One leadership myth is that the learning curve is steepest in the early years,
flattens as one learns to be a good leader, and is level toward the end of one’s
leadership career. Good leaders report that there is a learning curve—but that
it’s shaped the other way! In the early stages they learn what others already
know; at more advanced stages they learn about what is currently unknown,
which is far more.
SELF-AWARENESS

Through learning, leaders become more self-aware. They understand their
strengths and their weaknesses, the impact they have on others and the impact
that others have on them. They have a better understanding of their own
competencies, character and the commitment they bring to their roles. This
self-awareness adds to their strength as leaders, even when it is an appreciation
of their own weaknesses. They recognize that they are their own raw material
that can be moulded into something better.30
TRUSTING

Finally, leaders learn to trust. They recognize that to run successful
organizations they must be prepared to cede control to others, even as they
retain responsibility and accountability for outcomes over which they have
little or no control. They learn to trust their teams and themselves, both their
knowledge and their intuition. And when that trust is betrayed, as is inevitable,
they learn to rebuild trust again, for there is no practical alternative.
Developing Good Leaders
Some organizations develop leaders and seem to have a surplus of them and
others have to go to the market every time they need leaders. Most organizations
develop some of their next-generation leaders and go to the market to hire only
out of necessity or to strengthen or refresh the talent pool.
Organizations known for leadership development search out, attract
and recruit talented people who have already exhibited leadership in other
arenas and have demonstrated potential to do the same for their new employers.
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FIGURE 8:

Becoming Better Leaders

Performing

Trusting

Risking

Becoming
a Better
Leader

SelfAwareness

Stretching

Learning

Leadership on Trial | A Manifesto for Leadership Development

65

GOOD LEADERSHIP

GOOD LEADERSHIP

FIGURE 9:

Developing Good Leaders
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This leadership may have been in academic areas, in social activities, in sports,
in the military, in community service, or in a variety of other fields.
These leader-development organizations convert this raw potential
pool of talent into mature, high-performing leaders with a defined leadership
profile for increasingly responsible leadership roles. The best of them do this in
a systematic way that recognizes the importance of policies, pathways, programs
and processes in which senior leaders are fully engaged. Designing and
executing these requires a true partnership between executive leaders and
leadership development/human resource professionals.
PROFILES

Leadership profiles are clear statements of what the organization expects
leaders to achieve, know, understand and be. The best of these specify the
results leaders are expected to achieve (e.g. profitable growth), the competencies
they should demonstrate (e.g. lead highly effective teams), and the character
elements that describe good leaders in the organization (e.g. integrity).
These profiles act as:
n

n
n

n

A beacon for aspiring leaders or those that aspire to higher
levels of performance;
A performance check for current leaders;
A statement of accountability so that customers, suppliers,
employees and community members know what to expect of
a business organization’s leaders; and,
A guide for leadership assessment and development.

POLICIES

Leadership-development policies address the goals and principles governing
leadership talent development and may range from the all-encompassing,
sweeping commitment, “to develop leadership talent from within,” to more
specific commitments, such as posting leadership opportunities so everyone
can apply for them, or promoting the movement of talent between divisions or
departments, so potential leaders can get critical experiences needed to
develop to their maximum potential consistent with the current and future
needs of the organization.
PATHWAYS

The best organizations for leadership development have given careful thought
to the pathways people can take to get these critical experiences. They have
identified jobs, roles, assignments and sometimes even the coaches and
mentors who will provide the maximum value-added benefit to leadership
development, depending on the individual’s needs.
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PROGRAMS

These organizations use both custom-designed and customized programs and
widely available open-enrollment public programs to further their development.
Custom programs tend to focus on building organizational competencies and
common culture, whereas open-enrollment programs develop people, business
and strategic competencies.
PROCESSES

Organizations known for leadership development also invest time and money in
developing and integrating various leadership-development processes including
recruiting, succession management, assessment, coaching, mentoring and
personal development planning. Critically, they also ensure they retain leadership
talent by continuing to offer challenging development assignments and ensuring
compensation and benefits reflect competitive realities.
PARTNERSHIPS

Becoming and being a leadership-development organization requires a
partnership between the executive team and leadership-development (LD)/
organizational-development (OD)/human-resource (HR) professionals within the
organization. The executives must provide the drive, energy and commitment to
leadership development themselves by being, “leader-breeders,” and ensuring,
“leader-blockers” don’t get in the way of aspiring and capable individuals.31
They must also break down organizational barriers to mobility so people can get
the experiences they need. The LD/OD/HR professionals must design the profiles,
programs, pathways, processes and policies that make the whole thing work.
The Social Responsibility of Leaders
As long as corporations and their business leaders can have an impact on
the economic, social and environmental health, welfare and well-being of the
societies within which they operate, those societies will demand that they act
responsibly. The demand for corporate social responsibility (CSR) will be
expressed in marketplace response as well as through political and legislative
channels and special interest groups.
CSR IS THE RIGHT APPROACH

To be responsible for one’s personal and corporate actions is a moral obligation
even if it is not legally required. To the extent that business benefits from what a
society has to offer, it is morally obliged to contribute to the health and welfare
of that society. Unless faced with a completely unjust law—the apartheid rules in
South Africa, for example—there is a moral obligation on business to obey the
laws of the land. Beyond that there are moral obligations to clean up one’s own
mess, compensate people for harm that has been done, and otherwise take
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FIGURE 10:
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care of those whose lives and livelihoods may have been affected by corporate
actions and managerial decisions.
CSR IS THE SMART APPROACH

Business leaders derive their benefits from the societies within which they
operate. It follows they must be positive contributors to the continued health
and welfare of those societies because it is in their interest to do so.
Businesses have a conditional licence to operate. If they meet societal
expectations, they can operate. If they violate them, they will be controlled,
regulated or perhaps put out of business.32
Apart from any moral requirement to be socially responsible, business
leaders must consider the interests of many stakeholders, including shareholders,
integrate those interests where possible, and balance them when they are
mutually exclusive (to the extent this is possible). Failure to do this analysis and
act appropriately may be reflected in the reactions of customers, regulators,
employees, investors and others, with subsequent implications for long-term
shareholder value.
THE QUANTUM OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

At the very minimum, business leaders must comply with relevant laws and
regulations. Good business leaders should seek standards of excellence in
areas such as environmental performance, safety and health, employment
equality and discrimination that reflect positive societal trends when they can
see long-term benefits for their shareholders, customers, employees and
communities. We are mindful of those that argue it is neither the purpose nor
the prerogative of business leaders to lead social revolutions. This is not what
we advocate. Rather, it is to respect existing social movements and use the
resources of their organizations to enable them for the benefit of their stakeholders.
BEING SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE

We take the position that it is both right and sensible to act in a socially
responsible way. We also acknowledge it is often not easy to define what this is.
It requires business leaders to recognize different perspectives, seek creative
ways to pursue joint problem-solving and find the appropriate balance between
competing interests. We also take the position that it can never be right for
business leaders to make decisions without, at least, carefully considering the
impact of their actions on the communities, broader societies and economic
and political systems within which they operate.
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WHETHER THE QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS IMPROVES OR NOT WILL DEPEND

on the efforts of many. In this section we issue a “call to action” to five groups:
those like ourselves who are involved in management education in universities
and colleges; today’s senior leaders in the business community; professionals
in the field of organizational and leadership development; boards of directors
of companies; and, finally, to next-generation leaders themselves.
Management Educators
In the wake of the financial markets meltdown, much criticism focused on
business schools and their graduates. Some of this targeted the alleged
narrowness of the curriculum, some the social irresponsibility of business
school graduates, and some their arrogance, overconfidence and sense of
entitlement. Whether these criticisms are justified or not, recent economic
events suggest everyone involved in management education must do a
pulse check and consider in what way the content, delivery and potential
consequences of their programs will influence how future business leaders
see their roles and responsibilities.
Specifically we believe that:
Curricula should be reviewed to ensure degree-program students get
significant exposure to economic and business history taught in ways relevant
to today’s issues and tomorrow’s leadership challenges.
Students should be encouraged and assisted to consider values and
virtues as part of management decisions in all fields of business, not just those
typically addressed by organizational behaviour or human resource courses.
Faculty members, unused to doing this and without formal training, should
receive help in doing so.
The often single-minded focus of business school professors on
maximizing shareholder value and near-exclusive application of financial costbenefit analysis as the implicit or explicit ethical decision-making framework
warrants serious examination. Faculty members from a range of disciplines
should be equipped to introduce a wider range of analysis and decision-making
models that would broaden students’ appreciation of other stakeholders and
their claims in the decision-making process.
Programs must create a greater capability to scan the economic,
political, societal and technological environments to identify “predictable crises”
before they emerge in full-blown form. They must create greater awareness of
complex systems and the options leaders have to manage what they do not
understand or cannot control, and give students and program participants the
conceptual base and skills associated with systems thinking.
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There must be much greater recognition of the social-psychological
processes at work that distort reality and interfere with rational decision-making.
There must be much tighter linkages between this conceptual understanding
and the actions leaders must take to avoid creating organizational cultures in
which conformity, overconfidence, hubris and groupthink are commonplace. This
will require materials and exercises set in mainstream business contexts in
which the consequences are felt in terms that are truly consequential to students.
Students also need to develop the skills of constructive dissent so
they can oppose actions they believe are wrong without having to sacrifice their
careers. They must be able to analyze that vague sense of “something is not
right here” so they can define the issues, check against their values, engage in
good conversations with those who can help them think through the issues
and their possible response, and then make decisions that are right for them.
While it is difficult to assess the impact of role models students come
into contact with in their formal business programs, such as guest speakers,
business schools should strive to maximize exposure to really good role models
who emphasize the importance of values and virtues as well as competencies
and commitment to lead.
Educators’ own behaviours—what they say, do, or don’t say and do—
have an impact on many students. If they dismiss some corporate wrongdoing
with humour instead of censure, or minimize or avoid dealing with unethical
behaviours, they may convey a set of values that will have substantial negative
impact. At the same time, they cannot be self-righteous about business
practices in the real world if they are to maintain their personal credibility.
Business and management schools and their professors and
instructors must take ownership for the organizational cultures they manifest
and promote through their own organizations, programs and course designs, as
well as the conversations they encourage, and ideas and behaviours they reward.
They cannot simply blame systems such as promotion and tenure, the scientific
academy, or compensation and reward systems for actions that are inconsistent
with a value-based leadership approach to the delivery of their expertise.
Finally, educators must commit to instill in those they have the
privilege of educating a deep intellectual and instinctive understanding of the
critical relationship between those who lead businesses and the societies within
which they operate. The essential nature of that contract is one of cooperative
and reciprocal obligations. Whether they accept the philosophical underpinnings
of corporate social responsibility or not, they should be under no illusions
about the pragmatic consequences of failure to operate within the bounds of
societal expectations.
While recognizing our responsibilities in this context, experience tells us
we will only make a difference if our actions are reinforced by the experiences
our students and program participants have in the organizations they join or
come from. We can act to improve education, but we need others to act also.
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Current Leaders
Leaders must be the strongest advocates of anticipatory leadership and the
prime enemies of complacent thinking. They must be more aware of the dangers
of viewing their business environments solely through the lens of their current
business models and realize their current business models—what got them
here—will not necessarily work in a new environment.
They must integrate short-term shareholder returns with other
stakeholder demands and societal expectations if the enterprise is to
be sustainable.
They must create and sustain cultures of constructive dissent in
which individuals and groups can express their concerns with policies and
strategies and can contribute to vigorous debate about alternatives without
being devalued or marginalized.
They must strive to create learning organizations by demonstrating
they are also continuous learners.
They must insist as much effort be placed on character development
of their up-and-coming leaders as on developing their competencies.
They must recognize words, policies, principles and processes mean
nothing unless they are reflected in their behaviours and may, indeed, be
undermined by any “say-do” gap not closed quickly.
Leadership- and Organization-Development Specialists
There are almost limitless opportunities for leadership and organization
development professionals to add more value to their organizations. These
opportunities lie in fully exploiting the development of leadership competencies,
character and commitment as described earlier in this volume.
One starting point is the development of leadership profiles that
capture the key competencies, character and commitment the organization
wants to see in its leaders. Such profiles act as beacons. They signal what
it takes to be successful as a leader in the organization and what various
stakeholders should expect of leaders in the organization. They also serve as
visible commitments and leaders must expect to be measured against them.
The development and ratification of a leadership profile opens up a
vast scope for learning- and organizational-development (LD/OD) professionals
to create programs, developmental pathways, performance and development
coaching, succession management and other supporting processes. It serves
as the basis for engaging top management in systematic talent reviews and
facilitates executive group discussion of career-related moves for high potentials.
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Once executives understand the need to focus on leadership
competencies, character and commitment, they must be able to turn to
the LD/OD/HR leadership to devise or improve the systems for leadership
assessment, recruitment, development and succession management. LD/OD
professionals will have to be even closer to the business issues and context in
which leaders must be developed than they are typically today. Such familiarity
will help them establish partnerships with line and functional executives so
they can contribute to the development of current and future leaders.
Boards of Directors
One critical lesson gained from the recent financial and economic crisis is that
boards should not allow a CEO to be the only conduit of corporate information,
nor should the CEO be the sole assessor of risks facing the corporation.
Boards must improve their understanding of the strategic, operational,
reputational and financial risks in which the organization is engaged. They must
be able to verify the extent to which their organizations are exposed to those
risks and understand the strategies available for risk mitigation.
Boards, and especially governance committees, must take a more
dynamic view of board composition than is traditionally taken. Directors today
may require much deeper understanding of risk, technology, or global
operations than in the past. Governance committees must ask themselves
whether the board has this level of understanding and, if not, what they are
going to do about it. This may lead to requirements for more education of
boards or individual directors, and it may require boards to refresh their
membership more frequently and radically than in the past.
Boards can and should require independent, third-party assessments
of critical risks. Where these differ from management’s assessments, directors
must be fearless in provoking a discussion.
Boards need to change how they look at executive compensation.
It should be viewed as a risk variable and examined by the risk committee of
the board or by the board as a whole. The examination should address specifically
whether proposed or established compensation schemes encourage or
discourage the right risk-taking behaviour.
Finally, boards should be wary of CEOs with narcissistic tendencies,
who appear excessively confident, who resist or appear to resent deep and
tough questioning, and who appear to be continually “selling” to their boards or
“managing” them. When faced with this type of situation, boards should exercise
even greater scrutiny and, if resisted, ultimately replace that CEO.
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Next-Generation Leaders
Finally, our call to action goes out to those who aspire to leadership. We urge
you to:
n

n

n

Strive to develop the full range of your leadership potential. Know
yourself—get in touch with your values, understand your personality
traits and recognize how they impact others.
Take reasonable risks with your career to stretch and learn. Be prepared
to make mistakes but be even more prepared to learn from them.
Stay grounded. Recognize no matter how much success you have,
your only guarantee of future success is to retain your basic humility.

Leadership on Trial | A Manifesto for Leadership Development

77

Conclusion
WE HAVE USED RECENT EVENTS AS A WAY OF REFLECTING ON LEADERSHIP AND, SPECIFICALLY,
leadership of business organizations. Some may think this somewhat unfair
but we considered it to be the type of crisis that was simply too good to waste.
It forced us to confront the gaps between what we know about good leadership
and the state of practice. This research supports the view that good leadership
is about the competencies, character and commitment of leaders and how
these are reflected in decisions made and implemented in continually
changing contexts.
We set out by hypothesizing that good leadership would have made a
difference in what happened, both in the buildup to the recent economic and
financial crisis, and in the way individuals and enterprises managed the
outcomes. We think that the evidence from this qualitative study supports this.
We concluded by presenting some basic principles of leadership and leadership
development that address what good leaders do, the kinds of people they
need to be, how they develop and how organizations can develop them. These
principles form the basis for improving leadership practice today and for
developing better leaders for tomorrow.
Every author reflects his or her personal values in their writing, and
we are no exception. The mission of the Richard Ivey School of Business is:
“To develop business leaders who think globally, act strategically and contribute
to the societies in which they operate.” We believe in this mission. It has shaped
this research, our conclusions and the prescriptions we have presented. We will
endeavour to reflect these values in our future work on leadership development.
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